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of buying a house in the life cycle. The model is applied to three recent
Belgian household budget surveys. We ﬁnd that households postpone
homeownership or choose to be lifelong tenant due to an increase of the
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11 Introduction
The transaction taxes associated with buying a house are relatively high in
the diﬀerent Belgian regions. In Flanders, for example, the basic rate of the
registration fee equals 10 percent of the sales price, if the house is purchased on
the secondary market. If the house is bought on the primary market, then there
is an indirect tax of 21 percent. Moreover, these taxes form only part of the total
transaction costs which include search and negotiation costs and intermediation
fees.1,2 As a consequence, such taxes and other transaction costs potentially
play an important role in the tenure choice of households.
The choice problem between renting and owning a house is both theoretically
and empirically well documented. Empirical studies on tenure choice mainly
concentrate on this dichotomous choice between renting and owning, taking
into account demographic characteristics and economic explanatory variables
like (permanent) income and measures of borrowing constraints (see, e.g.,K i n g ,
1980, Gyourko and Linneman, 1997 and Haurin et al., 1997).
In this study, we present an alternative approach to model tenure choice.
Rather than focusing on the above dichotomous choice, we model the moment
in the life cycle that a household becomes homeowner. This is done by means
of an ordered logit model.3 The discrete outcomes in the model consist of the
moments in the life cycle at which an individual may purchase a dwelling. An
individual can, for example, become a homeowner before the age of 30, between
the age of 30 and 40, etc.4 The last choice category consists of people for whom
it is never optimal to buy a house to live in (life long tenants). Empirically,
these are people who turn out to be (still) tenant at the age of 70 or older.
We posit that the transaction tax rate has a considerable impact on the
timing of homeownership. More speciﬁcally, we expect that if the transaction
t a xr a t ei sh i g h e r ,t h e nt h ep u r c h a s eo fah o u s ew i l lb ep o s t p o n e dt oal a t e r
moment in the life cycle. This can be embedded in theory as follows (see, e.g.,
Goodman, 1995, or Bar-Ilan and Blinder, 1988). When choosing between rent-
ing and owning, a tenant household compares the respective user costs for a
given amount of housing services. The user cost of owner-occupied houses is
aﬀected positively by the real interest rate on mortgages and negatively by the
evolution of real house prices (see Dougherty and Van Order, 1982). Because of
income tax advantages associated with ﬁnancing house purchases, the user cost
of owner-occupied housing may be lower than the rent a tenant pays. However,
these advantages should be high enough to counterbalance the transaction costs
associated with switching from the rental market to becoming a house-owner.
Next to transaction taxes, other explanatory variables like demographic char-
1The housing market is far from perfect; e.g. many information costs are involved.
2In Belgium the intervention of a notary is legally compulsory.
3A somewhat related approach can be found in Guiso and Jappelli (2002). They study the
eﬀects of private transfers and borrowing constraints on the timing of homeownership via a
survival analysis, where buying a house is considered as a ‘failure’ (namely, the ‘failure’ to
survive in the rental market).
4Of course, we also deal with households consisting of several individuals. Age then refers
to the age of the head of the family.
2acteristics and economic variables may aﬀect the timing of homeownership. A
higher permanent income, for example, increases own funds, which make it pos-
sible to pay the downpayment and to decrease the time necessary to save the
downpayment.5
The ordered logit model is applied to data that are drawn from the 1997-
1998, 1999 and 2000 Belgian household budget surveys. The sample selection is
for homeowners who purchased their house after 1952 and for tenants who are
older than 70 years; the latter thus chose the last outcome of the ordered logit
model; these are people who stay renter during their whole life.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 goes further
into the ordered logit approach to tenure choice. In Section 3, we discuss the
data. Empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Homeownership and the life cycle
In the empirical application, we will consider six outcomes with respect to the
moment in the life cycle that a household becomes homeowner. The diﬀerent
outcomes are clearly ranked: a household may become homeowner before the
age of 30, between the age of 30 and 40, between the age of 40 and 50, between
the age of 50 and 60, between the age of 60 and 70 or prefer to stay renter during
t h ew h o l el i f ec y c l e .A s s u m i n gt h a tp e o p l ew h or e p o r tt ob et e n a n ta tt h ee n d
of the life cycle (at an age of 70 or higher) have never been house-owner before,
this observed category comprises (part of) the lifelong tenants.6 Because of the
inherent ordering of the diﬀerent outcomes, we can make use of an ordered logit
model to analyse the timing of homeownership (Walker and Duncan, 1967, also
Greene, 2003).
To see this, consider the following latent regression:
y∗
i = x0
iβ + εi, (1)
where y∗
i is an unobserved latent variable, reﬂecting the global transaction cost
for household i, expressed in terms of utility, to switch from the rental market
to homeownership, including subjective evaluations of information costs. The
vector β is a vector of unknown parameters converting the vector of explanatory
variables xi into their contribution to the utility cost of transaction costs. The
variable εi is an unobserved disturbance term reﬂecting stochastic preference
5In Belgium credit rationing is usually based on the current income position of the can-
didate borrower. Legally, there is no downpayment ratio but interests increase prohibitively
large if one wants to borrow more than 80% of the house value. This formally almost coincides
with a downpayment constraint.
6Our dataset does not allow to identify tenants who once owned a house or owners who
purchased and sold a house in the past. This problem is negligible, though, since the mobility
with respect to own houses is very low in Belgium. Only in the last stage in the life cycle,
households often sell the own house and move into an old people’s home. This feature is not
a problem in our application, since people who live in so-called collective households are not
taken up in household budget surveys. On the other hand, almost no households became
house-owner after the age of 70. These few observations were omitted for the analysis.
3diﬀerences between households, not controlled for. This variable is assumed
to be logistically distributed, i.e. F (εi)= 1
1+e−εi . The higher the transaction
cost, the longer it will last until the household will buy a house. This can be
understood as follows. Let µk reﬂect the expected utility gain from switching to
homeownership during the k-th period of the life cycle, measured at time k (for
1 ≤ k ≤ 5, for the last period in the life cycle, k = 6, only lifelong tenants being
selected). It is natural to assume that this gain increases over time: ﬁrstly,
the household succeeded to save money during a longer time period, so that
the portion of the house that should be debt-ﬁnanced declines, when buying
later in the life cycle. Secondly, buying a house entails a lock-in cost, caused
by the impossibility of adapting the house to changing housing needs during
t h el i f ec y c l ew i t h o u tb e a r i n gn e wt r a n s a c t i o nc o s t s . 7 The relation between the
unobserved y∗
i and the observed outcome for household i, yi (yi =1 ,2,...,6),
can be summarized as follows:
yi =1 i f y∗
i ≤ µ1, (2)
=2 i f µ1 <y ∗
i ≤ µ2
=3 i f µ2 <y ∗
i ≤ µ3
...
=6 i f µ5 ≤ y∗
i .
In words, if the expected utility gain of switching to homeownership at time k
exceeds the transaction cost, then the household will buy during period k.I n
fact, the µ’s are those unknown utility gains to be estimated. These µ’s must
satisfy µ1 <µ 2 < ... < µ5. For the discounted utility gains, though, we assumed
that the net utility gain of a later period will never exceed the net gain of buying
one period earlier. If this were not the case, then every household would keep
on postponing homeownership and remain lifelong tenant. The probability that
household i becomes homeowner between the age of 40 and 50 (yi =3 )i st h u s
equal to the probability that the latent variable y∗
i is between µ2 and µ3.S i n c e
we assume that the disturbance terms are logistically distributed, we obtain the
7While renting, moving also bears a transaction cost (search and information costs) but
this cost is much lower than in case of buying a new house.
4following probabilities:
Pr(yi =1 ) = P r( x0
iβ + εi ≤ µ1)=
1
1+e x p( x0
iβ − µ1)
, (3)
Pr(yi =2 ) = P r( x0
iβ + εi ≤ µ2) − Pr(x0
iβ + εi ≤ µ1)
=
1




1+e x p( x0
i β− µ1)
,
Pr(yi =3 ) = P r( x0
iβ + εi ≤ µ3) − Pr(x0
iβ + εi ≤ µ2)
=
1












1+e x p( x0
iβ − µ5)
.
The derived logit model could also be interpreted independently from the
latent variable equation (1), explaining the motives behind the optimal moment
in the life cycle of purchasing a house, as a reduced form modelling the inﬂuence
of the xi variables on the probability to buy a house at a certain moment in
the life cycle. It is precisely these reduced form eﬀects that will be of interest
in the empirical exercise below. The estimation of the unknown coeﬃcients β
and thresholds µ can be done numerically by means of the method of maximum
likelihood, where the above probabilities are the elements of the likelihood func-
tion. It is clear from equation (1), that the probability that homeownership is
postponed increases, if βj is positive and the corresponding explanatory variable
x
j
i increases. This can be seen more formally by calculating the derivatives of
the cumulative probabilities:










where Pr(yi ≤ k)= 1
1+exp(x0
iβ−µk).T h i sc o n ﬁrms that the probability of buying
earlier than time k in the life cycle decreases with an increase in any of the
explanatory variables, say j,i fβj is positive, and the other way around if
βj ≤ 0.
However, coeﬃcients of this kind of models are to be interpreted carefully.
Marginal eﬀects associated with the probability that one becomes homeowner
in the kth stage of the life cycle are as follows:

























where µ0 = −∞ and µ6 = ∞. Clearly, unambiguous statements on the basis of
the sign of the estimated coeﬃcients β can only be made with respect to both
5boundary probabilities Pr(yi = 1), the cumulative probabilities Pr(yi ≤ k)a n d
Pr(yi =6 ) = 1− Pr(yi ≤ 5). The sign of the estimated coeﬃcients is less
informative for the marginal eﬀects associated with the other probabilities.
3D a t a
The data used in this study are drawn from the budget surveys of 1997-1998,
1999 and 2000 of the Belgian National Statistics Institute. Apart from expendi-
tures, incomes and demographic variables, the surveys contain information on
whether a household owns or rents the house in which it lives. For homeown-
ers, also the year of purchase of this house is available. These survey data were
complemented with macroeconomic variables like the interest rate on mortgages,
coming from the National Bank of Belgium, and a regionally diﬀerentiated in-
dicator for the evolution of house prices through time.8 The price indicator
and nominal interest rates were deﬂated by the consumer price index in the
empirical exercise (see Dougherty and Van Order, 1982).
T h es a m p l et h a ti su s e di nt h ee m p i r i c a le x e r c i s ec o n s i s t so ft e n a n t sw h o
were older than 70 years and homeowners. Since the house price indicator only
goes back to 1953, homeowners who purchased their house before 1953 were also
excluded. This ﬁnally results in a sample of 6635 households.
Table 1 gives some summary statistics on the selected sample. Monetary
variables are expressed in year 2000 euros. The transaction tax rate, real interest
rate on mortgages and the regional house price indicator are those of the year of
purchase of the house for homeowners. For tenants, these variables are those for
the year in which they participated in the survey. Note that not all demographic
variables in the table are adequate for the empirical exercise. Family size and
number of children, for example, are associated with the household’s situation at
the time of participation to the budget survey. Of course, these variables do not
necessarily correspond to the household’s structure at the time of purchasing
the house and, therefore, will not be included in the analysis below. Other
demographic variables like level of education or region are less vulnerable to
this problem.9 In order to take account of a similar problem with respect to
income, we will use nondurable expenditures as a proxy for permanent income
in the empirical exercise.10
Figure 1 presents the timing of homeownership for the selected sample. As is
clear from the ﬁgure, 71% of the households have purchased their house before
the age of 40. The greater part of this group became homeowner between the age
of 30 and 40. As could be expected, the numbers of households that purchase
8In Belgium, no index for house prices is available. We drew the data from a weighted
average of sold houses, provided by stadim, a real estate study group.
9Movements between two regions are rather rare in Belgium because of the diﬀerent lan-
guages used.
10Note that this variable is not independent from the household structure at the time of
the survey. We believe, however, that it reveals enough information on a household’s life time
income.
6an own house in later stages of the life cycle are much lower. Finally, some 6%
of the households turn out to be lifelong tenants.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (6635 obs.)
Variable Mean Std.dev.
Age head of the family 53.10 14.90
Dummy for female head of the family 0.25 0.44
Family size 1.99 0.91
Number of children 0.91 1.17
Number of employed 1.04 0.91
Dummy for Flemish Region 0.51 0.50
Dummy for Walloon Region 0.36 0.48
Dummy for lower secondary school 0.22 0.42
Dummy for higher secondary school 0.26 0.44
Dummy for non-academic higher education 0.20 0.40
Dummy for academic higher education 0.10 0.30
Nondurable expenditures 26814.27 13199.10
Income 34839.33 26095.33
Transaction tax rate 0.11 0.05
Regional house price indicator 2.23 0.53
Real interest rate on mortgages 0.047 0.026
Notes: Brussels Capital Region is reference category for regional dummies. Primary school is
reference category for education dummies. Monetary values are in year 2000 euros. Regional
















Figure 1: Timing of homeownership
4 Empirical results
Table 2 reports the results of the ordered logit estimation of the timing of
homeownership. All explanatory variables are signiﬁcantly estimated at the 5%
signiﬁcance level. As remarked earlier, the signs of the estimated coeﬃcients are
only directly informative for the probabilities associated with the ﬁrst (home-
owner before the age of 30), the last choice outcome (lifelong tenant) and the
cumulative probabilities. It is easily seen from equation (5) that a negative
coeﬃcient implies that the probability of purchasing a dwelling before the age
of 30 and/or earlier in the life cycle increases, if there is an increase in the
corresponding explanatory variable. Alternatively, the probability of being a
lifelong tenant decreases if there is an increase of the explanatory variables with
a negative coeﬃcient.
It is clear from the table that, ceteris paribus, the probability of becoming
homeowner (before the age of 30) is higher for households with a higher level of
nondurable expenditures (as a proxy for permanent income). In line with the
underlying decision model, the probability of purchasing an own house decreases
if the transaction tax rate is increased. Otherwise said, the probability of life-
long tenancy increases with the transaction tax rate. The same applies to the
regional house price indicator: the higher this index, the lower the probability
of homeownership. Also the coeﬃcient associated with the real interest rate
on mortgages has the expected sign: the higher the interest rate, the greater
the probability of lifelong tenancy and the smaller the probability of becoming
homeowner (before the age of 30).
8Table 2: Ordered logit estimation results of timing homeownership
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard error
Nondurable expenditures (in 1000 euro) -0.024 0.002
Dummy for female head of the family 0.286 0.054
Dummy for Flemish Region -1.311 0.074
Dummy for Walloon Region -0.884 0.075
Dummy for lower secondary school -0.764 0.070
Dummy for higher secondary school -1.039 0.070
Dummy for non-academic higher education -0.887 0.076
Dummy for academic higher education -0.680 0.093
Transaction tax rate 2.843 0.513
Regional house price indicator 1.013 0.046







Notes: Brussels Capital Region is reference category for regional dummies. Primary school
is reference category for education dummies.
9In order to be able to derive more information from the estimated coeﬃ-
cients, Table 3 presents the derivatives of the six probabilities for a selection of
important explanatory variables. These derivatives are calculated at the sample
means of the independent variables. It is clear from the table that a marginal
increase in nondurable expenditures increases the probability of becoming home-
owner before the age of 30, while it decreases all the other probabilities. We
see the reverse picture for the transaction tax rate: a marginal increase in this
rate decreases the probability of purchasing an own house before the age of 30,
but increases the probabilities associated with the other choice outcomes. A
lower probability to buy before the age of 30 implies also that the probability
of lifelong tenancy increases if the transaction tax rate increases. Note that
the probability mass that is shifted from the ﬁrst outcome is unequally divided
between the other outcomes: the probability of becoming homeowner between
the age of 40 and 50 (Pr(yi = 3)) is mostly aﬀected. As indicated earlier, also
marginal increases of the house price indicator and the interest rate on mort-
gages have a negative eﬀect on the probability of purchasing an own house
(before the age of 30). Again, the probability of becoming homeowner between
the age of 40 and 50 is increased mostly by the above marginal changes.

























Nondur. exp. 0.005 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trans. tax rate -0.605 0.023 0.252 0.145 0.062 0.123
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
House price indicator -0.215 0.008 0.090 0.051 0.022 0.044
(0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Real interest rate -0.466 0.018 0.195 0.111 0.047 0.095
(0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Note: P-values are between brackets.
As a ﬁnal exercise, we present the goodness-of-ﬁt of our model by means of
a ‘hits and misses’ table. The prediction rule is that a household is located in
the choice outcome with the highest probability, as calculated by the estimates.
Table 4 shows that the predicted outcome corresponds with the observed one
for 2619 (or 39.47%) of the households in the sample (see diagonal of the table).
This seems to be a fairly good result: a rule which assigns all households to the
outcome with the highest number of observations (outcome 2), would correctly
predict 36.97% of the outcomes. However, such rule misses a great deal of
what is observed in reality. Our model is able to correctly predict other choice
outcomes, like the probability of lifelong tenancy, as well.
10Table 4: Prediction results
1 2 345 6Total
1 973 1272 1 0 0 6 2252
2 934 1505 1 0 0 13 2453
3 257 658 2 0 0 22 939
4 73 344 3 0 0 6 426
5 25 144 0 0 0 4 173
6 0 240 13 0 0 139 392
Total 2262 4163 20 0 0 190 6635
Note: Rows are observed outcomes, columns predicted outcomes.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an ordered logit approach to model the optimal
moment in the life cycle to buy a living dwell. Rather than concentrating on
the dichotomous choice between owning and renting a house, we thus focused
on the moment in the life cycle that a household becomes homeowner. The
model was applied to data drawn from three recent Belgian household budget
surveys that contain information on the tenure choice of households. Crucial to
our application, the surveys also contain information on the year of purchase of
the own house for owners.
Our empirical results indicate that the transaction tax rate, which is rela-
tively high in the diﬀerent Belgian regions, has a negative impact on (early)
homeownership. The higher this tax rate, the more households postpone home-
ownership or choose to be lifelong tenants. Also real house prices and the
interest rate on mortgages have a negative impact on (early) homeownership.
In contrast with the former, higher expenditures on nondurables (that can be
seen as a proxy for permanent income) imply a higher probability of becoming
homeowner; and more speciﬁcally homeownership before the age of 30.
A possible avenue for future research may be the comparison of the results
obtained by our model with those obtained by the approach followed by Guiso
and Jappelli (2002). They modelled the timing of homeownership by means
of a survival analysis where the purchase of an own house is considered as a
‘failure’ (to survive in the rental market). The latter approach has the advantage
that it makes use of more information than our model (namely, observations
stemming from households that are tenants in earlier stages of the life cycle).
Unfortunately, this method could not be applied to our data set, since we do
not observe the (truncated) time spells during which households are renters.
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